Apart from that, there's not much to say about Bosnia, Srpska and Dodik.
We have reached the limit between pacifist and violent solutions. On the legal front, it's a dead end, and the High Representative has been keeping a low profile in recent weeks. The EU can't even coordinate to impose sanctions, and Dodik continues to travel abroad. On the military front, EUFOR does not seem to be intervening. Interpol refused to get involved.
As I predicted, Sarajevo quickly lost confidence in the EU's ability to help. Entire columns of trucks and armed vehicles have crossed the continent to arrive in Bosnia, with thousands of soldiers in all, helicopters and planes for probably nothing. Apart from sending a very bad signal to a country that has just been granted candidate status for EU membership, this inaction is bound to backfire.
US-sponsored conferences, assessments and reports were circulated on "Russia's growing influence in the Western Balkans" or "How ethnic tensions could be rising again". Bosnian politicians went from declaring that they didn't want to ask EUFOR to intervene because it wasn't its job, to sending letters to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, imploring him to act. EU diplomats essentially told Bosnia to clean up the mess itself.
The situation is therefore the same as it was at the start of this chapter a month ago: deadlocked. However, what is sure, is that Dodik proved that he can take strong measures without much consequences.